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Each day more than two trillion dollars, a sum e qual to almost one-fifth of the 
American gross national product, is transferred by wire.2  The dollar volume of checks 
processed in the United States alone exceeds 15 trillion dollars per year.3  The payment 
systems that carry these vast amounts span the globe and are subject to a myriad of 
sometimes-conflicting national laws.
With diverse laws governing a tremendous volume of trans-national payment 
transactions that involve large sums of money, one would expect that some legal scholar 
would have written a treatise about the comparative law of bank collections and payment 
transactions.  Yet, attorneys researching the laws that govern bank collections and 
payment transactions in different countries have found a surprising paucity of works on 
the subject.
While Professor Benjamin Geva's recent book, Bank Collections and Payment 
Transactions,4 was not written as a practice guide, it will meet the needs of many 
practitioners when presented with problems involving cross-border and offshore payment 
transactions.  This compact and scholarly book, which took seven years to write, provides 
a thorough and accurate comparative analysis of the laws that govern bank collections 
2and payment transactions in the United States, other common law countries, and in civil 
law jurisdictions.
Although the scope of the book is limited – for example, preauthorized debit and 
credit transfers and credit card payments are not discussed – the book covers a good deal 
of material not presented in most other works on payment systems.  The book compares 
the laws governing bank collections and payment transactions in Australia, Canada, the 
United Kingdom, France, Germany, Israel, Italy, Japan, South Africa, Switzerland and 
the United States.  It also discusses the Uniform Cheques Law (“U.C.L.”) of the Geneva 
Conventions of 1932 and various directives of the European Union that pertain to 
payment transactions and the bank-customer relationship.
Professor Geva is Professor of Law at Osgoode Hall Law School of York 
University in Canada, and is unusually well-qualified to write about the comparative law 
of bank collections and payment transactions.  He is a graduate of the Hebrew University 
in Jerusalem, holds an L.L.M. and S.J.D. from Harvard Law School and has been a 
visiting professor at the University of Chicago, the University of Illinois, the University 
of Cambridge, and law schools in Australia, France and Israel.  Professor Geva has 
written or co-authored several texts, including a leading treatise on the law of electronic 
funds transfers,5 and has published works on the payment systems of several countries.  
His experience, practicing law in Canada and working as an advisor to the governments 
of several countries on banking and payment systems, has enriched his scholarship.  For 
example, he provides an informative and accurate description of the structure and 
functioning of large value transfer systems not only in the United States, but in six other 
3countries and the European Union.6  Few American legal scholars would possess the 
requisite knowledge to do so.
The book is divided into four parts.  The first, an introduction, gives some 
background about the nature of payment transactions and the history and structure of the 
payment system that will be useful to practitioners who are unfamiliar with this area of 
law.  The author explains his objective in comparing the fundamental laws that govern 
payment transactions: to try to identify a “universal law merchant” applicable to payment 
transactions “transcending the boundaries of the diverse jurisdictions.”7  His premise is 
that because “the fundamental needs of payment transactions participants are quite the 
same," a universal law merchant exists "to the extent that solutions are common and 
pragmatic, so that gaps separating different legal systems are abridged.”8  His 
methodology also encompasses an analysis of the ways in which the principles existing in 
different legal systems have been adapted to deal with the circumstances of commercial 
and financial transactions arising within those jurisdictions.9
The second part of the book compares the juridical relationship between a bank 
and its customer in various legal systems, including the account agreement, the nature of 
a deposit, the bank’s duty to its customer (referred to as its “mandate” in the civil law 
systems), and the manner in which a customer’s current account is determined, including 
the bank’s right of setoff.  This portion of the book covers some subjects, such as the 
determination of the current account, that play a greater role in civil law systems and are 
not often given attention in common law jurisdictions.10 It includes a useful comparison 
of the extent to which the laws of several countries impose duties of care and good faith 
on banks and give force to disclaimers in bank-customer agreements, which can play a 
4decisive role in disputes between banks and their customers.11  It also compares in some 
detail the banking codes and general conditions that are imposed on the bank-customer 
relationship or that establish standards of banking practice in various countries, such as 
Canada’s Code of Practice for Consumer Debit Card Services,12 the U.K. Banking 
Code,13 and Germany’s General Business Conditions,14 and the extent to which 
provisions in bank-customer agreements are susceptible to challenge based on doctrines 
of unconscionability and the like.  However, American bank attorneys are likely to take 
issue with the author’s assertion that “[g]enerally speaking, a businessperson using a 
standard form contract is required to point out disclaimers and other onerous terms to 
customers.”15
In addressing the nature of the bank deposit, the book somewhat surprisingly 
discusses the situs of a bank account and the allocation of political risk only in one brief 
paragraph and three footnotes.16  Many of the major conflicts of the 20th century resulted 
in trans-national disputes that raised the issue of how to allocate political risk, where the 
deposit agreement failed to do so.  Examples include the Nazis’ confiscation of bank 
accounts of Jews, and other disputes among governments, banks, and their customers that 
were brought about by the expropriation of assets during the two World Wars and the 
Russian, Mexican and Cuban Revolutions.17 The resolution of these disputes may 
depend on whether a bank account is located within the borders of the expropriating 
government, and whether the account is in the nature of a loan by the customer to the 
bank, a bailment of the customer’s money, or some other right or obligation.
The book’s focus is on comparing a bank’s relationship with its customers, with 
other banks, and with third parties to payment transactions in various legal systems.  
5Practitioners seeking an in-depth analysis of federal regulation of banking in the United 
States generally will not find it a sufficient resource.18
In the third part of the book, Professor Geva analyzes the bank’s performance of 
the duties imposed upon it in the collection and payment of checks and other orders for 
disposition of funds and in credit transfers; and the effect of a bank’s error in performing 
these duties that results in misdelivery of funds.  In discussing the bank’s duties to its 
customer, the author uses the word “mandate,” a civil law term derived from Roman law 
which, however, is the source, in common law countries, of the contractual duty owed by 
an agent (in civil law systems, the “mandatary”) to its principal (the “mandator”).
The third part begins with an excellent and concise overview of the common as 
well as the distinguishing features of checks and the check collection process under 
various national laws.19 The overview is followed by a summary of check legislation in 
France, Italy and Israel,20 then by a discussion of the corresponding statutory law in the 
U.K., Canada and Scotland.21 Check collection under UCC Article 4 and funds 
availability under Federal Reserve Regulation CC are explained.22 The author then 
discusses the Geneva Uniform Law for Cheques (“ULC”),23 which is the basis of check 
legislation in the civil law countries, then describes deviations from the ULC in 
Germany, Italy, Japan, Switzerland and France.24
Lawyers who have had experience with NSF checks will be interested to learn 
from the book that two NSF checks in France within 12 months require the drawee bank 
to revoke the drawer’s checking authority, to demand the return of all blank checks, and 
to withhold all checking privileges for ten years unless the drawer pays a fine.25  Similar 
but less draconian laws also exist in Italy and Israel.26
6The book does not include any discussion of check truncation, and mentions 
electronic presentment of checks only in passing.27 With the enactment of the Check 
Clearing for the 21st Century Act ("Check 21"), effective October 28, 2004,28 check 
truncation and electronic check image exchange will become the usual method by which 
banks process checks.29 Check truncation permits the exchange of check images in 
electronic form as a substitute for the physical delivery of the paper check. It also, 
however, means the destruction of the original paper check by the depositary bank or 
another bank in the check collection process, making forgery and alteration difficult to 
investigate and prove.30 Check 21 will reduce legal impediments to check truncation by 
creating a new negotiable instrument called a substitute check, which would be the legal 
equivalent of the original check for the purpose of proving payment and would include 
most of the information contained on the original check.31
One of the longest sections of the book concerns credit transfers, with an 
emphasis on a detailed comparison of the laws of different countries regarding large 
value wire transfers.  The author is a leading expert on this subject and the book’s 
treatment reflects his expertise.  
A “credit transfer,” most commonly a wire transfer, can be understood 
metaphorically as a “push” transaction, in which a payor, called the “originator,” wants to 
“push” funds from its account to the account of a payee.32  The originator instructs its 
bank, called the “originator’s bank,” to send funds to the account of the payee, referred to 
as the “beneficiary” of the transfer.  The instruction is called a “payment order.”  The 
originator’s bank executes the payment order by sending another payment order to a 
“receiving bank.”  Payment orders are sent from one bank to another in sequence until a 
7payment order is sent to the beneficiary’s bank, which credits the account of the 
beneficiary and notifies it of the payment.  Settlement between banks is often made 
directly between participating banks through “vostro” and “nostro” accounts or a mutual 
correspondent bank.  Wire transfers that utilize Fedwire, operated by the Federal Reserve, 
as a clearing house are settled by debit and credit on the books of the Federal Reserve 
bank or banks.  Another clearing house facility is CHIPS, the Clearing House Interbank 
Payment System, operated by the New York Clearing House Association, an association 
of large New York banks.33 CHIPS is commonly used for cross-border wire transfers, 
and settlement is made by posting entries on the accounts of the participating banks at the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
In the section on credit transfers, the author first describes and compares the large 
value credit transfer systems in various countries, including the United States, 
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, Japan, Canada, France and Germany.  The European 
Union’s EURO-1 clearing and settlement service is also discussed, as are the laws of 
Quebec, Israel, and South Africa to some degree.  The book then discusses the legal 
nature of a credit transfer, the duties of the parties and the allocation of the risk of loss in 
credit transfer systems in these countries.  
The book makes clear some significant differences among national laws 
concerning loss allocation in credit transfers.  In the United States, the originator’s bank
has fulfilled its duty to the originator once it transmits a payment order to an intermediary 
bank and that order has been accepted.  In contrast, in some other countries such as 
Switzerland, the originator’s bank remains legally responsible for the transfer and is 
liable for any loss due to delay, error or insolvency until the beneficiary’s bank receives 
8the funds.  In view of the global nature of the credit transfer system, the extent to which 
national laws conflict in allocating the risk of loss is surprising.  One is left with the 
impression that loss allocation in credit transfers would be an appropriate subject for an 
international agreement, although, as the author points out, the Model Law on 
International Credit Transfer prepared by UNCITRAL has not been adopted by any 
country to date.34
A short section follows on checks and other drafts, such as “payable through” and 
“payable at” drafts, drawn on non-depository account holding institutions such as 
brokerage firms and insurance companies.  Debit cards are mentioned only in passing.  
The book does not discuss person-to-person payment systems and non-bank payment 
service providers, some of which, such as PayPal, do hold accounts for customers,35 nor 
new payment methods such as stored value cards and e-checks.
The final part of the book is a detailed comparison of laws that govern the 
allocation of losses resulting from a third party’s fraud that causes an unauthorized 
payment.  This part is divided into sections dealing with fraud in the issuance of payment 
instructions, such as forged checks and unauthorized payment instructions issued by a 
defrauder, and sections concerning fraud by a third party that causes misdirection of 
funds under payment instructions that were properly issued, such as forged indorsements 
of checks and credit transfers to an erroneous or non-existent account.
The final part begins with a convenient summary comparing the rules for 
allocation of loss due to a forged drawer’s signature or material alteration of a check in 
common and civil law jurisdictions, excluding the United States.36  The summary is 
particularly helpful in view of the fact, noted by the author, that the United States is the 
9only nation to have adopted specific code provisions on the allocation of forged check 
losses; in other common law countries loss allocation is determined according to often 
complex general principles of law, and in civil law countries according to general code 
provisions not specific to checks.37  The author goes on to compare the rules of different 
legal systems regarding modification of loss allocation by contract.
The author’s ensuing discussion of the problem of unauthorized electronic funds 
transfers (“EFT’s”) highlights the inconsistencies among loss allocation systems, both 
between the treatment of forged checks and unauthorized EFT’s within a legal system, 
and across legal systems.  He points out that UCC Articles 3 and 4 generally allocate 
forged check losses among banks and their customers according to fault in order to
encourage loss prevention,38 but the American statutory system for loss allocation in the 
case of unauthorized EFT’s downplays fault, and makes the loss allocation depend on 
whether the originating bank used commercially reasonable security procedures,39 or on 
whether a consumer provided the debit card, code or other access device to the 
perpetrator.40  In contrast, other common law jurisdictions tend to allocate forged check 
losses according to loss distribution principles41 but according to agency principles in the 
case of unauthorized EFT’s, giving full effect to the concepts of apparent and implied 
authority.42  Civil law jurisdictions such as Switzerland take yet a different view, placing 
the risk on even the non-negligent customer for forged check losses in most cases43 while 
allocating the risk of unauthorized EFT’s on the “mandatary” (originating) bank unless 
the loss would not have occurred in the absence of the customer’s negligence.44
The book goes on to provide a comparative analysis of laws on forged 
indorsements of checks.  On this subject the author explains how the Continental and 
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English legal systems, once similar, diverged in the 18th century. The Continental 
systems came to recognize the rights of bona fide purchasers to stolen instruments while
the English and American systems preserved the rule that a thief cannot pass title to an 
instrument.45 The Geneva U.C.L. expanded the Continental rule.46  However, the Anglo-
American rule, though preserved in the UCC, has been riddled with exceptions for 
indorsements by “responsible employees,” impostors, and fictitious and unintended 
payees, and altered by a comparative negligence rule where a party’s negligence 
substantially contributes to the making of a forged signature on an instrument.47
The book concludes with a section on misdirected credit transfers.  A point of 
interest is that the United States is the only country other than Germany to have adopted a 
code governing electronic funds transfers.48 In other legal systems, disputes concerning 
EFT’s are decided according to general principles of law.  The discussion of misdirected 
credit transfers in general law jurisdictions is perhaps the most original in the book, in the 
sense that it presents and analyzes material not collected in other sources.  Issues 
discussed include inconsistency between the beneficiary’s name and account number, 
non-existent or unidentifiable beneficiaries, and resolution of ambiguities and 
inconsistencies in the payment order by the beneficiary’s bank contrary to the originator’s 
true intention.  The author notes a trend toward a “strict compliance” standard in the 
interpretation of payment orders, and takes a position contrary to that trend and in favor 
of a more flexible approach.
Because the book was intended as a scholarly work, practitioners may find it less 
helpful as a practice resource than Professor Geva’s widely-cited treatise on electronic 
funds transfers.49 The book’s scope, limited mostly to checks and large value wire 
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transfers, will affect its usefulness to some practitioners.  The book gives little or no 
attention to some of the most common types of payment transactions.  Debit cards and 
other consumer EFT’s governed in the United States by the Electronic Funds Transfer 
Act (“EFTA”)50 and Regulation E51 are discussed only in connection with the disclosure 
requirements imposed on banks and their effect on the bank-customer relationship, and 
briefly in the section on unauthorized EFT’s.  Credit card payments also are not covered 
in the book, a major omission in view of the vast and growing volume of credit card 
payments and their importance in Internet and cross-border commerce.  A comparison of 
various countries’ laws applicable to credit cards would have been particularly valuable.
The book further omits discussion of automated clearing house (“ACH”) 
payments, which include pre-authorized debit and credit transfers such as direct payroll 
deposits, direct deposit of Social Security payments, and preauthorized bill payments.  
ACH payments are governed by the National Automated Clearing House Association 
Operating Rules, which are not discussed.
The book’s structure, centered on the civil law concept of “mandate,” may make 
the book difficult to use when researching a specific issue of American law regarding a 
payment transaction.  Unlike the author’s treatise on electronic funds transfers, the book 
does not include practice pointers that might assist practitioners in drafting or negotiating 
an agreement involving a payment transaction or in advising clients regarding a problem 
or dispute arising out of a payment transaction.
However, despite the book’s academic approach and the necessary limitations in 
its scope, it is a scholarly tour de force, and will be valuable to many practitioners who 
need to research issues pertaining to cross-border and offshore payments.
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